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Abstract 
 
This paper tests for neighborhood effects on children’s schooling, using unique data on rural 
residential neighbourhoods from Bangladesh. We find that school completion of children is 
positively and significantly affected by the mean grade completion of other children in the 
neighbourhood. We then present three pieces of evidence that suggest that the social effect 
offers a valid explanation. Firstly, the evidence we find of inter-household externalities is 
not driven out by control for a host of neighborhood and household attributes. Secondly, the 
result remains robust to neighbourhood composition effects: it is unchanged as we purge our 
main sample of the households within the neighbourhood that are potentially linked in terms 
of their recent history of partition. Thirdly, a similar peer effect is found for adults who 
completed schooling before the introduction of existing educational reforms in rural areas 
suggesting that the observed effect of growing up in educated neighbourhood does not 
merely capture the influence of common exposure to various government educational 
interventions. As a by-product, the paper also provides evidence of intra-household 
externality in children’s schooling, net of neighborhood externalities. We conclude by 
discussing the implication of these findings for education policy design. 
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1 Introduction 
The importance of the family in the process of human capital formation is well recognised in 
development literature. However, families in poorer countries could be in a much weaker 
position to aid children’s schooling through the provision of a supportive learning 
environment at home. In developing countries, school quality is low, adult illiteracy is very 
high and households investment in children are often credit constrained. The social 
environment, in such a setting, can help relax some constraints via proximity to educated 
individuals in the residential neighbourhood1. If the social environment is not perfectly 
correlated with household wealth, removing the credit constraints can only partly make up 
for differences in educational outcomes: children from dysfunctional neighbourhoods, with 
a poor social environment, may continue to demand/acquire less education. Hence, a greater 
understanding of the social process within the neighbourhood that mediates schooling 
should form an important consideration. However, the impact of social effects on schooling, 
arising via interactions with neighbours in the social space, is under-researched for 
developing countries2. The objective of this paper is to test for social externalities in human 
capital production in a developing country, with low average level of schooling, 
Bangladesh. We examine the extent to which an increase in schooling of adults and other 
children in the residential neighbourhood affects children’s school completion in rural 
Bangladesh. We find significant evidence of inter-household externalities: children’s 
education benefits positively from the mean education of their neighbouring peers. In 
 
1 Sociologists have discussed a variety of ways through which educational and socio-economic background of 
constituent members in the social space benefits children’s schooling outcomes. For a review, see Mayer and 
Jencks (1989). 
2 An exception is Weir (2007), which addresses some aspects of the issue using household survey data from 
rural Ethiopia. 
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addition to neighbourhood externalities, we also find evidence of intra-household education 
externalities, net of neighbourhood effects: children of uneducated parents have more 
schooling when co-residing with educated adults in the household.  
 There are three pieces of evidence that suggest the social effect as the principle 
explanation for inter-household effects. First, our evidence of peer effect is not driven out by 
control for a host of attributes such as income, landholding, and parental background at the 
neighbourhood and household levels. Furthermore, the results remain robust to 
neighbourhood composition: it is unchanged as we purge our main sample of households 
within the neighbourhood that are potentially linked in terms of their recent history of 
partition. Finally, peer effect in our data could be owing to common exposure to educational 
reforms introduced by the government in the study area. Yet a similar effect is found for 
adults who completed schooling before the introduction of the reforms. Our analysis of the 
long-term impact of schooling of neighbourhood peers bears out our claim of inter-
household externality in school completion. This is investigated in a model of decision to 
participate in wage work for a sample of adults, treating school completion as an 
endogenous covariate. We find that the mean schooling of neighbouring children during an 
individual’s school years increases the likelihood of wage work participation in adulthood, 
via boosting school completion: the education of neighbours during the childhood serves as 
instrument for own school completion in our wage participation model 
In Bangladesh, educational investment is widely considered as an important strategy 
to reduce poverty (Asadullah, 2006; Wodon, 2000). According to recent research, 
educational investment not only leads higher wage earnings in the labour market (Asadullah, 
2006), it also boosts agricultural production in rural Bangladesh (Asadullah and Rahman, 
2008). Therefore, increasing the level of school completion remains an important 
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development goal for the government. To this end, a sizeable economics literature on school 
participation and attainment of children in Bangladesh is available (e.g. Asadullah, 2005; 
Asadullah et al., 2007; Asadullah, 2008). Whilst such literature highlights various demand 
and supply side determinants of children’s schooling choices, none of the studies explores 
the role of externalities (beyond parental education) in children’s schooling. Hence, our 
study hopes to fill an important gap in the literature. Detailed knowledge of the determinants 
of school participation is important   
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical 
strategy and analytical framework in detail and revisits the issue of identification of social 
effects in the context of demand for schooling. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 
provides a discussion of the main findings. Section 5 presents the conclusion. 
2 Analytical Framework: Neighbourhoods and Educational Production 
A primary and perhaps the most relevant social space in a rural context is defined in terms 
of proximity of individuals by their place of residence. A common measure of 
neighbourhood (defined as such) in rural Bangladesh is “bari” i.e. a cluster of households. 
These household-clusters are widely observed all over rural Bangladesh, where individuals 
usually enjoying some form of kinship set up households next to each other around the 
common yard. A typical bari consists of two parts: bhitor bari (i.e. in-house) and bahir bari 
(i.e. out-house). Bhitor-bari houses kitchen and residential dorm. Non-relatives visiting the 
bari are only allowed in bahir bari. The out-house consists of a visitor room, otherwise 
known as kachari ghar, which is commonly located next to the common pond (i.e. outer 
pond) is meant for common usage by all bari males and visitors. Among other significant 
features, bari members usually cooperate with each other in times of crisis. Depending on 
the nature of the underlying kin relations, baris share among themselves various resources. 
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The common resources include pond(s) of the bari, outhouse for guests, in-out approach 
road(s) of the bari, graveyard, at times prayer room/mosque attached to the bari etc.  
The literature on neighbourhood effects speculates about various routes via which 
externalities within the bari can be expected to increase school completion. According to 
Manski (1993; 2000), externalities could take the form of an endogenous social effect (i.e. 
children’s education in the bari being influenced by the mean schooling of other children in 
the bari) and/or a contextual effect (i.e. children’s education in the bari being affected by 
the mean characteristics of children and/or their parents in bari). While sociological studies 
speculate about the various processes that could potentially generate social effects in a 
neighbourhood, most of these processes can be explained in terms of preference and 
constraint of individuals (Manski, 2000).  
A correlation between a child’s schooling and education of neighbouring peers, 
namely an endogenous social effect, could arise when greater school completion among 
children relaxes some constraints in educational production for the index child. One such an 
interaction is facilitated by lessons swapping among peers in the bari. When school 
attainment is, inter allia, reliant on home assignments, children in proximate grades may 
collude in preparation of such assignments3. The burden of home assignments is usually 
progressive across grades so that at higher grades, benefits of cooperation are larger, 
particularly among children of credit constrained families. Hence, higher participation of 
older or same aged children in relevant grades (predicted by their age) enlarges the pool of 
“school-success-specific” knowledge within the bari, leading to positive constraint 
interactions. Alternatively, elder children in higher grades could share their accumulated 
 
3 However, children enrolled in the same grade in a school may also compete and decide not to cooperate. 
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knowledge acting as mentors or simply pass on their notes and other tangible school inputs 
to children enrolled in immediately lower grades. 
Similarly, a contextual social effect arises when children’s interactions with educated 
adults in the neighbourhood relax some constraints underlying the educational production 
function. For example, neighbouring educated mothers in the bari could substitute for own 
mother’s education, particularly when one’s own mother has little or no education. Given 
the distinction between proximate uneducated and isolated uneducated in society, what 
matters in children’s education is not the actual but rather the effective level of education of 
own mothers, defined in terms of mother’s proximity to other educated adults within the 
household and outside, in neighbouring households (Basu and Foster, 1998)4.
To summarise, all the above possibilities imply that whilst studying educational 
outcomes in developing countries, one needs to expand the educational production function 
by accounting for the socio-economic mix of the children in their residential neighbourhood. 
This point is emphasised throughout the paper. We are interested in assessing whether 
school completion of a child is affected by that of other children and adults in the reference 
population i.e. the bari. The econometric framework for estimating the production function 
accounting for neighbourhood characteristics is discussed in the next section. 
2.2 Empirical Strategy: Testing for Education Spillover 
We employ a simple linear regression model for years of schooling completion where 
individual schooling varies linearly with the mean outcomes in the group, with mean 
exogenous attributes of the bari, and with other personal attributes that may be common 
across all group members. Such a model is specified below: 
 
4 The framework is extendable beyond household, to neighbourhood and can be disaggregated by 
characteristics of the literate household member such as gender and age (Basu and Foster, 1998). 
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[ ] [ ]bi b bi b bi bi b biS S x x    = 	 + 	 + + + (1) 
where, Sbi is grade attainment and Eb[Sbi]JJ is the corresponding group level (i.e. the mean 
schooling of children in b-th bari) analogue. xbi proxies for individual specific 
characteristics (e.g. gender, religion, parental education etc.) of i-th child in b-th bari. Eb[xbi]JJ
proxies for the mean characteristics (e.g. mean education of adult male/female in the bari) of
b-th bari members5. b is unobserved heterogeneity common across children within the b-th 
bari and bi is a random error term.  
 In equation (1), the social effect is captured altogether by Eb[Sbi] and Eb[xbi]. In 
Manski’s (1993) terminology, a significant  is a measure of endogenous social effect. On 
the other hand, the contextual social effect is captured by the coefficient on Eb[xbi]. Given 
that xbi are pre-determined, contextual effects are exogenous in educational production. 
Furthermore, baris are often formed on the basis of kinship. In all such cases, b is 
significant: children of immediate kins residing in the same bari are likely to share or inherit 
common characteristics. Poor control of b or the “correlated effect” (in Manski’s term) 
leads to non-social effects, the presence of which biases the estimated endogenous and 
contextual effects.  
However, even if no correlated effects are present in the data,  is not identified in a 
simple linear regression (unless additional assumptions are made), due to what Manski 
refers to as the reflection problem. Data on outcomes do not reveal whether group behaviour 
actually affects individual behaviour or whether group behaviour is simply an aggregation of 
individual behaviour. This suggests that the endogenous effect cannot be separated from 
various contextual effects. One solution to identify  is obtained by adopting a dynamic 
 
5 In the calculation of bari averages we take out the index child and all his/her other family members. Hence, 
despite being calculated at the bari level, for each child the Eb[Sbi] and Eb[xbi] vary across households within 
the bari. 
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model using retrospective data on group variables. If there is a lag in the transmission of the 
social effect (i.e. children learn from the educational experiences of their preceding 
reference group), then one can include the lagged group mean schooling as a regressor in 
addition to the education of their own cohorts. In the case of the former, non-social factors 
remain contemporaneous while the social effect acts on the individual with a lag. Apart from 
yielding a crude identification strategy, this also bypasses Manski’s reflection problem if the 
effect of “education of own cohort” is absent: contextual effects become separable from 
endogenous effect. The last point becomes evident as we re-formulate our structural 
equation by including education of an older cohort of peers in equation (1): 
[ ] [ ]bi b bi b b(i+j) bh bi bi b biS S S x x      = 	 + 	 + 	 + + +   (2) 
Here, Eb[Sbi] is the mean peer schooling of own cohort defined over peers in the bari who 
are of same age or at most 2 years younger/older than the index child. Eb[Sb(i+j)] refers to the 
mean peer schooling of the older cohort. The older cohort consists of those children who are 
3 to 5 years older than the index child (hence j ranges from 3-5). If the “own cohort” effect 
is absent (i.e.  = 0), equation (2) reduces to the following: 
[ ]bi b b(i+j) bh bi bi b biS S x x     = 	 + 	 + + +   (3) 
Assuming no correlated effects, the effect of endogenous interactions due to education of an 
older cohort is then separable from other contextual interaction effects in equation (3) on the 
ground that mean education of older cohort is invariant to the education of the index child. 
However, the omission of the “own cohort” effect leads to an omitted variable type of bias 
so that equation (3) remains the preferred specification (over equation (1)). This 
specification distinguishes between endogenous effects arising from own and older cohorts 
of peers in the bari. Resulting regression estimates of social effects therefore should be 
taken as evidence of association without implying any strict causal relation. 
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9
The structural equation (2) describes endogenous social effects in terms of mean 
schooling of peers. Such linear model of social effects, however, is too simple to fully 
unpack the processes underlying a social effect. To better explore the “black-box of social 
interactions”, we expand equation (2) by including additional variables on the right hand 
side so as to distinguish between different types of constraint interactions. On specific bari 
characteristics, in addition to “mean schooling” of peers of own and lagged cohort in the 
bari, we include two additional regressors to distinguish between various underlying 
mechanism via which social interaction effects arise; these are discussed below. 
 (i) Birth order within bari: Children may benefit from interactions with other 
children in higher grades via direct mentoring or through inheritance of school study 
materials (and school resources such as textbooks). Given the prospect of such an externality 
arising from the presence of bari children in sufficiently higher grades, the relative ranking of 
a child in the grade distribution of his peers should be taken into account. As an exogenous 
proxy for this, we use “birth order within bari” of the index child. Excluding own siblings, 
this variable gives the birth order of a child among all the bari children (aged 6-17 years). 
 (ii) Maximum grade among peers: Control for maximum grade attainment among 
peers allows separating the effect of role models by older children in higher grades. Hence, 
we expect a positive effect of this variable. 
 Turning to contextual effects arising from adult education in the bari, the most 
prominent is that of the effect of neighbouring mothers as home tutors. To test this effect of 
bari mothers’ education, we include two dummies, each identifying the presence of at least 
one: (i) grade 1-4 educated mother in bari and (ii) grade 5+ educated mother in bari.
The distinction between mothers and non-mothers is because, educated non-mothers 
may respond differently compared to those who are mothers of school aged children. The 
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focus on mothers as a source of externality is consistent with the literature on social benefits 
of female education. Basu and Foster (1998) also point out that at the margin, the external 
effects of education/literacy are likely to be larger if the source of the externality is a female 
rather than a male. In our model, to further purge the effects of mother-specific variables 
from that of other educated adults in the bari, we additionally control for the presence of at 
least one non-mother with (i) 1-4 years of schooling (ii) 5 or more years of schooling and 
(iii) mean schooling of adult males in the bari. This allows us to net out the contribution of 
non-mothers and adult males in the bari. 
 Given the close link between households and residential neighbourhood (i.e. bari), 
the impact of intra and inter-household externalities should be studied together. Hence, in 
addition to inter-household externality, we also look at intra-household externality. We 
interact own mother’s education dummies (i.e. mother with no education and mother with 
grade 1-4 equivalent education) with a dummy that identifies whether there is at least one 
primary school educated adult in the household. A significant positive coefficient on the two 
resulting interaction terms would imply that children of less-educated but proximate mothers 
(i.e. those with co-resident educated non-spouse adult householders) have more schooling 
relative to that of similarly educated but isolated mothers. Our simultaneous focus on intra 
and inter-household externalities is thus likely to yield better estimates of these two types of 
externalities to the extent that common bari environment is driven by common family 
background effects6.
2.3 Additional Tests of Education Spillovers 
 
6 Support for such a specification also comes from Ginther et al. (2000) who find that the coefficients on 
neighbourhood variables tend to fall in value and lose statistical significance as the specification of family 
variables become more complete. 
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Despite the proposed regression specification, our empirical strategy is likely to be fraught 
with the problem of “correlated effects”, arising due to the composition of the 
neighbourhood and omission of common correlates of schooling. First, children in the 
neighbourhood may have similar schooling outcomes if they belong to equally well-
resourced households and household income remains poorly measured. Second, inter-
household correlation in schooling could capture the possibility that some of the peers are 
related by blood i.e. a sub-sample of households in the neighbourhood comprise of extended 
families. Below, we outline two tests to assess the robustness of our findings to these issues. 
An additional test of the educational spillover is also discussed. 
i.  Accounting for Inter-household Ties: The composition of neighbourhood in our 
analysis poses two challenges. The bari, our measure of neighbourhood, consists of 
households whose heads are usually related by blood or affinal connections. The inter-
household relations inside the bari are either defined by immediate kinship or by 
heterogeneous kinship among constituent households. Following this, the observed 
correlation of schooling among bari members may potentially capture nothing but inter-
household ties. For instance, couples living in close proximity (i.e. in the same bari) to their 
parents may be enjoying all the benefits of joint residence in a single household headed by 
their parents7.
To this end, we create a sample (of “non-linked” households) that consists of 
households which are not related to each other in the same bari in terms of their recent 
 
7 Apart from the issue of resource pooling among “linked” households, separation of linked households is 
important for another reason. Some education may have been provided during the period when the linked 
household members were still co-resident. Even if it is the case that an index child is enrolled in school only in 
post-partition period, correlation with schooling of children in other households today may simply capture the 
common home learning environment shared in their pre-school years. Since most of the children (aged 6-17 
years) were not born in 1982, this, however, is less of an issue to the extent most of the schooling occurred 
soon after 1982. 
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history of household partition.  In the other sample (i.e. “linked” household sample), heads 
of households currently in the same bari co-resided in the same household in the recent past 
and were therefore likely to have retained close economic ties. We then split our sample 
observations between “linked” and “non-linked” sample, and estimate the regression models 
separately to observe whether the externality effect differs across inter-household kin ties. In 
particular, we test whether evidence of social effect persists once we purge our main sample 
off the linked-households. The exact sample construction rule is discussed in detail later on 
in the paper. 
ii. Unaccounted Income Effects: We test whether externality (owing to one’s 
proximity to educated non-spouse adults within and outside the household) is capturing an 
unobserved wealth effect or operates via enhancing household income. We do this via 
additionally controlling for per capita expenditure whilst estimating an instrumental variable 
model of grade completion treating expenditure as an endogenous regressor. This also 
improves our estimates of inter-household externalities to the extent that incomplete control 
for income creates an omitted variable bias. 
iii. Alternative Test of Inter-household Externality Effects: If bari spillover effects 
experienced during one’s childhood are genuine, we would expect children from better 
educated baris to perform better in the labour market, than those from educationally 
depressed baris. Therefore, testing for labour market success of children who grew up in 
baris with higher schooling would suffice as an indirect and additional test of inter-
household externality within the bari. To this end, we exploit the existence of retrospective 
data on bari schooling (or social environment) of individuals currently in the labour market. 
We use this data to construct instruments for schooling attainment which is modelled as an 
endogenous determinant of wage work participation. 
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For our model of wage work participation, we estimate a IV-Probit regression where 
the dependent variable takes the value one for wage work and is zero otherwise. The IV-
Probit model is based on Amemiya’s Generalised Least Squares (AGLS) estimators for 
probit with endogenous regressors and is more efficient than the two stage conditional 
likelihood model (2SCML) proposed by Rivers and Voung (1988). The endogenous 
regressors are treated as linear functions of the instruments and the other exogenous 
variables and corrected standard errors are reported.  
 Apart from the endogenous schooling variable, the regressions control for individual 
and household characteristics. We use the following lagged variables as instruments for own 
education variable: (i) mean peer schooling of boys in the own cohort, (ii) mean peer 
schooling of girls in the own cohort, (iii) mean peer schooling of older cohort and (iv) mean 
schooling of adults (i.e. individuals aged 18-65 year olds) in the bari. If the retrospective 
bari variables turn out to be (jointly) significant as excluded instruments for “years of school 
completion” in our model, we can claim to have evidence of social effects arising from 
one’s residence in better-educated baris. This test is important for an additional reason. 
Evidence of peer effect in children’s education could capture correlated effects in the form 
of common exposure to educational interventions introduced during 1990-1996. However, 
individuals who are currently in the labour market attended school before such reforms were 
introduced. Hence, significance of peer variables (i.e. excluded instruments) in the first stage 
regression for this cohort would serve as a partial test of the hypothesis of “correlated 
effect” related to common participation in educational intervention programs.  
3.3 Data Description 
This research combines data on residential neighbourhoods from two independent censuses 
and one sample survey all conducted in the Matlab Thana, located in South-East of Dhaka, 
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the capital of Bangladesh. Most of the data primarily came from the The Matlab Socio-
Economic Census (henceforth MSEC) 1996, conducted by the International Centre for 
Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B), covered a population of 25,000 
households in 141 villages in the Matlab Thana. Census records are preserved by the Centre 
in the form a Demographic Surveillance System (DSS). Our choice of a random sample of 
baris from the census database has been guided by the availability of data from an 
independent survey on the same population for the year 1996, as well as an earlier census 
for the year 1982. These include the Matlab Health and Socio-Economic Survey (MHSS) 
1996 and the MSEC 1982. Conditioning the primary sample selection on the MHSS data 
enables us to complement our analysis of MSEC data with detailed individual, household 
and community level information available from the MHSS.  
Individuals in the censuses and the survey population can be linked at the individual, 
household and bari level using unique bari, person and household identification number. We 
therefore merged information on sample individuals from the three sources and created three 
unique samples to estimate our empirical models as discussed in the earlier section. The first 
two consist of all children of school age whereas the third sample comprises of a sample of 
adults in the bari for whom we have retrospective information on the characteristics of their 
childhood neighbours. The exact rules for construction of these samples along with a 
description of the characteristics of the resulting samples are discussed below. 
3.1  Construction of the Working Sample 
Our primary sample consists of individuals drawn from the MSEC 1996 population. Since 
the MSEC data could be used along with the MHSS, we have extracted the MSEC data from 
the DSS database as follows. The MHSS surveyed a random sample of 2687 baris in the 
Page 14 of 39
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
15
Matlab Thana area, treating the bari as the primary sampling unit (PSU)8. We have therefore 
selected these baris to form our random sample. Next, records on all household and 
individuals in the sample baris were extracted. This yielded data on 79094 individuals 
residing in 14869 households.  A total of 527 baris (or 19.61% of all baris) comprise of 
single households. The rest consists of two or more households. On average, there are 9 
households in a bari. The size of the bari can also be judged in terms of number of resident 
children of school age. On average, the number of (6 to 17 years old) children per bari is 
16.3 with a range of 1 to 143 and median of 13. The summary statistics of the MSEC sample 
data are presented in Appendix Table 1.  
 A second sample is constructed by combining the MSEC 1996 data with that of the 
MHSS. The MSEC 1996 does not provide data on expenditure or income. However, such 
data is available from the MHSS. Taking advantage of the overlap in the survey population 
and timing, we merge the MHSS sample households with the MSEC 1996 records. Given 
that the MHSS sampled only 2 households per bari, the resulting sample is much smaller in 
size: The MSEC-MHSS linked sample contains 4993 children in 2156 male-headed 
households in 1494 baris.  
 The third sample for our analysis is constructed by linking data on individuals aged 
20-32 years in MSEC 1996 with their neighbourhood records in MSEC 1982, preserved in 
the DSS database9. Unique identification numbers were used from the DSS database to link 
individuals and households across the two censuses. This yielded a sample of 9749 
 
8 First, one household was drawn from each of the baris that consisted of a single household. A total of two 
households were sampled from the remaining baris, each of which had more than one household. This led to 
data on a total of 24266 individuals in 4364 households. Detailed information on the MHSS 1996 is available 
in Rahman et al. (2001). 
9 We focus on this age-group to ensure that all individuals in our 1996 sample were of school-age. However, 
focusing on this age-group implies that our dependent variable, grade completion, is left censored. The 
resulting estimates of the education spillover effects (using censored data) are likely to be biased downward; 
without accounting for censoring in the data would yield a lower bound of the true spillover effects. 
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individuals for whom we have data on their occupational status and socio-economic profile 
of their residential neighbourhoods.  
4 Results and Discussions 
Table 1 presents OLS estimates of the determinants of grade completion using the MSEC 
1996 data. The regressions are estimated over a sample of children aged 6-17 years10. The 
regressors are age, sex, religion and birth order of the child; characteristics of the household 
head (e.g. age, sex, education, occupation); education and age of the head’s spouse and 
household landholdings (homestead and cultivable)11. We also control for various bari 
characteristics such as landholdings (homestead and cultivable), total number of children 
aged 0-5 years and 6-17 years and total number of adults (aged 18+ years) in the bari. It 
may be recalled that the bari level variables discard all individuals in the index household 
for whom the variable is being calculated. Hence, all the bari variables reflect the 
neighbourhood effect net of own/household effect. 
All regressions include village “fixed effects” (FEs) which control for village level 
variation in school quality. Regression results in Table 1 are reported separately for full, male 
and female samples. For each sample, specification (1) refers to male-headed households 
(MHHs) whereas specification (2) corresponds to female-headed households (FHHs)12. Only 
findings specific to our variables of interest are discussed below in detail. In the light of this, 
 
10 Given this age range, censoring of the dependent variable remains an issue, either due to non-enrolment or 
current enrolment (so that last grade completed is yet to be observed).  To correct for potential bias due to non-
enrolment in school, one may estimate a sample selection model. However, in the absence of convincing 
exclusion restriction, we have not pursued this route. Hence, our results need to be interpreted with a degree of 
caution. 
11 Controlling for mother/head’s spouse age is important because older mothers are likely to have greater 
experience as a child carer or home tutor. 
12 The separation of the full sample data by gender of the head is unavoidable because in almost 95% of cases, 
female-heads do not have their spouse present in data (either because they are divorced or the male partner is 
located outside the study area). Splitting sample observations by gender is important because there may be 
gender differences in the ability to benefit from social interactions. 
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we first discuss the findings on bari-related externalities, which are then followed by the 
results on within-household externality.  
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Table 1: OLS estimates of determinants of grade completion (Children aged 6-17 years) 
 Full Sample Boys Girls 
MHHs FHHs  MHHs FHHs  MHHs FHHs 
Age 0.243 0.391 0.290 0.502 0.179 0.267 
(9.57)** (6.02)** (7.75)** (5.10)** (5.21)** (3.05)** 
(Age squared)/100 0.596 0.107 0.364 -0.341 0.905 0.603 
 (5.54)** (0.39) (2.31)* (0.84) (6.21)** (1.63) 
Female 0.020 0.063     
 (0.92) (1.14)     
Hindu 0.108 -0.140 0.286 0.109 -0.054 -0.450 
 (2.18)* (0.88) (3.91)** (0.47) (0.81) (2.05)* 
Birth order in family -0.167 -0.199 -0.158 -0.152 -0.184 -0.240 
 (12.61)** (5.16)** (8.10)** (2.55)* (10.38)** (4.72)** 
Education of Household-head 0.062  0.069  0.055  
 (14.18)**  (10.64)**  (9.35)**  
Head’s spouse has no education -0.813  -0.792  -0.826  
 (19.07)**  (12.68)**  (14.34)**  
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4 education -0.340  -0.339  -0.355  
 (5.62)**  (3.76)**  (4.41)**  
Head’s spouse has no education & proximate 0.362  0.329  0.394  
 (11.01)**  (6.81)**  (8.86)**  
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4 education & proximate -0.026  0.006  -0.027  
 (0.41)  (0.06)  (0.31)  
Head has no education  -1.184  -1.249  -1.084 
 (14.55)**  (10.16)**  (9.91)** 
Head completed grade 1-4  -0.564  -0.607  -0.530 
 (5.22)**  (3.56)**  (3.75)** 
Head has no education & proximate  0.670  0.880  0.499 
 (7.80)**  (6.85)**  (4.28)** 
Head has 1-4 grade & proximate  0.249  -0.059  0.513 
 (1.55)  (0.24)  (2.41)* 
Birth order in bari 0.030 0.027 0.021 0.027 0.039 0.029 
 (12.96)** (3.48)** (6.35)** (2.21)* (12.47)** (2.75)** 
Mean peer schooling, girls of own cohort 0.118 0.105 0.100 0.087 0.134 0.143 
 (15.60)** (5.54)** (9.16)** (3.07)** (12.97)** (5.45)** 
Mean peer schooling, boys of own cohort 0.109 0.053 0.107 0.048 0.112 0.047 
 (14.15)** (2.67)** (9.56)** (1.66)+ (10.58)** (1.67)+ 
Mean peer schooling, girls of older cohort 0.050 0.052 0.038 0.043 0.061 0.058 
 (7.66)** (3.18)** (4.02)** (1.72)+ (6.94)** (2.62)** 
Mean peer schooling, boys of older cohort 0.041 0.056 0.039 0.060 0.045 0.043 
 (6.73)** (3.56)** (4.36)** (2.58)* (5.46)** (1.98)* 
Maximum schooling among peers  -0.014 -0.013 -0.026 -0.001 -0.003 -0.034 
 (1.45) (0.47) (1.77)+ (0.02) (0.25) (0.92) 
Mean schooling of male adults in bari 0.035 0.056 0.038 0.013 0.028 0.096 
 (5.25)** (3.19)** (3.96)** (0.48) (3.16)** (4.12)** 
Presence of (grade 1-4) educated mother in bari 0.026 0.108 0.024 0.120 0.038 0.119 
 (1.02) (1.62) (0.63) (1.22) (1.10) (1.31) 
Primary educated mother in bari -0.023 0.001 -0.057 0.107 0.007 -0.066 
 (0.85) (0.01) (1.42) (1.02) (0.19) (0.66) 
Primary educated adult female in bari -0.037 0.117 -0.005 0.148 -0.064 0.106 
 (1.14) (1.27) (0.10) (1.06) (1.46) (0.85) 
Grade 1-4 educated female adult in bari -0.006 -0.087 0.004 -0.206 -0.008 -0.023 
 (0.16) (0.87) (0.07) (1.34) (0.17) (0.17) 
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.54 0.64 0.65 
Village Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 18906 3464 9701 1794 9205 1670 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. The regression constant is suppressed. Regressions also control for total number of children aged 0-5 
years and 6-17 years; total number of adults in the bari; head’s occupation; mother’s (head’s spouse’s) age, 
religion; dummies to control for missing data on mean peer schooling variables13; head’s spouse and age of 
 
13Since neighbourhood variables are missing for single-household baris, inclusion of such dummy variable 
essentially controls for single-household baris in our sample. 
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bari children’s education; landholding of the index household and other households in bari. 4.1 Main 
results 
Birth order in the bari: This variable takes the value 1 for the eldest child in the bari. We 
find a significant positive coefficient of birth order for all samples, indicating that younger 
bari children tend to achieve higher grade completion. Although defined with respect to 
other children in the bari, birth order within bari potentially varies for every child within the 
family. Hence, we also estimated an alternative specification by fully controlling for (i) 
household-level fixed effects and (ii) bari-level fixed effects (results not reported). In both 
cases, the coefficient remains highly significant and positive. Its inclusion somewhat 
reduces the effect of birth order within the family indicating that part of the disadvantage of 
being the youngest in the family is off-set by the advantage of being younger among bari 
peers. To the extent that the potential role model effect is captured by the maximum grade of 
bari children in our model, the positive effect of birth order within the bari is attributable to 
the prospect of tutoring by older peers within the bari.
Mean education of peers: Four key variables of interest in this study are mean peer 
schooling of boys and girls of their own cohort and that of the older cohort in the bari (all 
being potential proxies for endogenous social effects). Whilst all the four variables are 
highly significant, those of particular interest relate to the effects of the older cohort 
variables. As discussed earlier, these serve as superior proxies for endogenous social effects. 
Turning to the gender effect, there is no statistical difference between the effects of mean 
education of male and female peers. The effect does not vary across the sample of boys and 
girls. Similarly, boy-boy and/or girl-girl interaction does not appear to be statistically 
different from boy-girl and/or girl-boy interaction.  
Maximum schooling among peers: Contrary to our expectation, maximum grade completed 
among bari children has a negative, albeit insignificant effect on individual grade 
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completion. This is suggestive of the absence of any potential role model effect arising from 
the presence of peers in higher grades. 
Bari adult female education: The two dummy variables – the presence of at least one mother 
with grade 1-4 equivalent education and one with primary grade completion in the bari -- 
have no significant effect. This result is not surprising since, a priori, neighbouring educated 
parents act as home teachers only if own parents are relatively less-educated. As an 
alternative test, we re-ran the regressions by splitting the sample of children by educational 
status of the household-head (results suppressed). None of the bari female adult education 
variables were significant for the sample of households headed by educated males whereas 
for the sample of households with uneducated heads, presence of at least one (grade 1-4) 
educated mother has a strong positive effect14. This confirms our prior that the positive 
externality due to proximity of educated mothers in the neighbourhood exists but is 
exclusive to children of uneducated parents. 
Intra-household education externality: Turning to household specific variables, the 
coefficients on “head’s spouse has no education” and “head’s spouse has grade 1-4 
education” are negative and highly significant (Table 1; MHHs sample)15. This confirms 
that children of less-educated mothers have less schooling. However, coefficients on the 
interaction terms (i.e. “head’s spouse has no education & proximate” and “head’s spouse 
has primary education & proximate”) are positive and significant. This suggests that the 
disadvantage of being born to uneducated mothers is partially offset in presence of co-
resident primary educated adults in the household. To be precise, children of isolated 
14 Education of bari “non-mother female” adults still have no effect. 
15 Although the effect of mother’s education is not necessarily exogenous to the extent that male heads with 
higher taste for educated children marry educated female so that mother education merely captures unobserved 
taste for education of the head. 
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mothers are worse than that of proximate uneducated mothers. This finding is robust to 
control for bari fixed-effects (regression results available upon request) and hence 
suggestive of “intra-household externality” in education. However, much of the intra-
household externality (as reported in our study) is likely to be specific to joint families. 
Using Indian data, Foster and Rosenzweig (2002) find considerable evidence that joint 
family children have higher educational attainment than those in nuclear families. 
Nevertheless, the sources of variation in the characteristics of these non-spouse adult 
members in extended families could be endogenous in educational production to the extent 
that the incident of co-residence (and hence the availability of additional educated persons) 
itself is driven by the demand for household specific public goods such as education (Foster, 
1998). Hence, care is needed in interpreting the finding on intra-household externality.  
5 Additional Tests 
5.1 Splitting Sample by Inter-Households Ties 
It may be recalled that household-heads in baris are often related via kinship. The heads of 
all or a subset of households in a given bari may be related as brothers or father and sons or 
mother and sons (Rahman et al., 2001). Besides, it may be that a set of household-heads in a 
bari who are all brothers in 1996 (or two household-heads in 1996 are related as father and 
the son) have resided in the same household in the recent past, say, in 1982. Since these 
household partitions occurred after 1982 (the year for which we also have MSEC data), by 
1996 many of them may be retaining some of the earlier links that they enjoyed as members 
of same household. If so, the estimates of the bari social effect may simply serve as a proxy 
for the benefit of joint residence in a single household (such as sharing a public good like 
education). If so, the separation of households “linked” by their history of partition from the 
“non-linked” households allows a way to further minimise the kinship-related “correlated 
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effects” (e.g. characteristics common to cousins) which may otherwise bias our estimate of 
bari social effects. 
Information on household partition is not directly recorded in our data. To identify 
and separate out these households from others (i.e. which have not split) within a given bari, 
we follow a rule adopted by Foster (1993). According to Foster, a household partition takes 
place if two individuals enumerated in a given household in period t-1 were observed to be 
household-head in period t. Hence, if two heads from the same bari in 1996 are found to be 
co-resident of a household in 1982, then we assume that household partition has taken 
place16. Then we separate these recently partitioned households (whose heads were in the 
same households in 1982 but separated thereafter to form new households) from the rest of 
our MSEC 1996 sample. The main sample purged of the “linked” households yields the 
sample of “non-linked” households. Note that household partition referred to above is 
different from the case of new headship, where there is merely a transfer of headship, for 
example, following the death of the earlier household-head unless another member from the 
same household co-exists in the same bari in 1996 but as the head of a separate household17.
In addition, there may still be household partitions where parted household is located outside 
the bari. But we do not look at that as we are primarily interested in the relation between 
households within the bari, not outside. 
 There are some notable differences in the characteristics of the “linked” vs. “non-
linked” sample. “Linked” households appear to be headed by younger adults. For “non-
linked” households, mean school completion of children is 2.46 compared to 1.93 for 
 
16 This approach discards all households set up outside the study area i.e. Matlab Thana. These are treated as 
events of migration. 
17 In this scenario, Foster (93) further distinguishes between “new household” and “inherited household”. If the 
original head was still in the study area and lived in the household of one of the new heads, then that new head 
is assumed to have inherited a household. Such a distinction between inherited and new households is not 
made in our analysis for we do not focus on the impact of partition. 
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“linked” households and the difference is statistically significant (p-value 0.00). Household-
heads in “linked” sample also have less schooling. These differences are interesting for the 
following reason. Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), in their study of the determinants of 
household division in India, find that intra-household inequality in schooling increases the 
probability of household division. Conditional on mean and variance of schooling, increase 
in maximum schooling decreases the probability of a household split. The division of 
households thus contributes to a reduction in within-household inequality, but increasing 
differentials in inter-household average schooling. Hence, higher mean schooling attainment 
of children in our sample of “non-linked” households may be capturing the fact that these 
households are also more likely to have sustained as joint families compared to the sample 
of “linked” households (which are more likely to have experienced a dissolution and hence, 
nuclear). 
Regression results for “non-linked” and “linked” sample households are reported in 
Table 2. The respective bari variables for “non-linked” (“linked”) households are generated 
using information on all other households in the bari which are “non-linked” (“linked”) to 
the index household. For the sake of brevity, we report stimates focusing on the male 
head’s spousal education (instead of the own mother’s education). The first two columns in 
Table 2 correspond to “non-linked” sample, whilst the last two report results for the “linked” 
sample.  
 Both the bari and village fixed-effects models for both samples yield significant 
evidence of intra-household education externality. However, on inter-household externality, 
all the bari variables related to female adult schooling are insignificant for the “non-linked” 
sample. The effects of mean schooling of bari boys and girls are highly significant and 
positive. Since this sample excludes “linked” household children, estimates for “non-linked” 
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sample are less likely to be contaminated by common characteristics as would have 
prevailed due to the presence of children related as first cousins and so on18. For the 
“linked” sample, education of bari mothers also exerts significant positive influence. These 
findings are consistent with Foster (1993). Using a sample from Matlab censuses 1974 and 
1982, Foster finds that recently partitioned households within baris are significantly linked: 
children’s education is affected by characteristics of other linked households in the bari 
which co-existed as joint-families in 1974. However, the distribution of resources within 
bari also matters, controlling for linked household fixed effects.  
18 In our analysis children in linked (non-linked) households benefit from interactions with children from 
linked (non-linked) households only. This imposes a restriction that non-linked (linked) household children are 
outside the social space of children from linked (non-linked) households. 
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Table 2: FE and OLS estimates of determinants of grade completion for “non- linked” and 
“linked” households (Children aged 6-17 years) 
 
“Non-linked” “Linked” 
FE OLS FE OLS 
Age 0.328 0.271 0.273 0.214 
(10.49)** (8.42)** (6.26)** (4.78)** 
(Age squared)/100 0.518 0.562 0.749 0.949 
 (3.88)** (4.17)** (3.86)** (4.87)** 
Female 0.027 0.050 -0.089 -0.098 
 (0.93) (1.83)+ (2.18)* (2.52)* 
Birth order in family -0.165 -0.153 -0.155 -0.142 
 (8.80)** (9.06)** (5.50)** (5.65)** 
Education of Household-head 0.049 0.062 0.062 0.067 
 (7.61)** (11.46)** (5.76)** (7.98)** 
Head’s spouse has no education -0.916 -0.943 -0.531 -0.611 
 (14.08)** (17.15)** (5.87)** (8.22)** 
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4 education -0.379 -0.422 -0.184 -0.216 
 (3.89)** (5.09)** (1.59) (2.24)* 
Head’s spouse has no education & proximate 0.367 0.402 0.302 0.280 
 (7.77)** (9.87)** (3.77)** (4.29)** 
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4 education & proximate -0.023 0.000 -0.014 -0.021 
 (0.23) (0.00) (0.10) (0.19) 
Mean peer schooling, girls of own cohort  0.119  0.112 
 (13.70)**  (8.21)** 
Mean peer schooling, boys of own cohort  0.081  0.097 
 (9.17)**  (7.30)** 
Mean peer schooling, girls of older cohort  0.059  0.058 
 (7.28)**  (4.22)** 
Mean peer schooling, boys of older cohort  0.032  0.034 
 (4.24)**  (2.55)* 
Maximum schooling among peers   -0.034  -0.017 
 (2.85)**  (1.02) 
Birth order in bari 0.042  0.060 
 (9.92)**  (7.76)** 
Mean schooling of male adults in bari 0.043  0.029 
 (5.50)**  (3.02)** 
Grade 1-4 educated mother in bari -0.011  0.124 
 (0.34)  (2.58)** 
Primary educated mother in bari -0.009  0.048 
 (0.25)  (0.94) 
Primary educated adult female in bari -0.048  -0.023 
 (1.24)  (0.26) 
Grade 1-4 educated female adult in bari -0.004  0.157 
 (0.09)  (1.60) 
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.59 0.50 0.60 
Bari Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No 
Village Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
N 12729 12729 5166 5166 
Note: Same as Table 1. 
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5.2 Intra- and Inter-Household Externalities: Income Effects? 
The externality due to one’s proximity to educated adults (in the household and outside in 
the bari) may capture an income effect: uneducated parents may earn more in the labour 
market due to their proximity to other educated adults in the household/neighbourhood 
(Basu et al., 2002). Social interactions then boost schooling merely via relaxing the family 
budget constraint.  If so, superior control for household income (proxied by household per 
capita expenditure or LnPCE) would predict a fall in the size of the externality estimates. 
Subsequently, we test this hypothesis using the MSEC-MHSS linked sample data. The 
regression results are reported in Appendix Table 2. With the inclusion of LnPCE and 
controlling for bari fixed-effects, uneducated spouse’s proximity to primary educated non-
spouse adult in the household continues to exert a positive significant effect on grade 
completion (specification 1). However, the effect becomes statistically insignificant once we 
treat LnPCE as endogenous (specification 2)19. It seems that externality benefit of having 
educated non-spouse adults in the household is being transmitted via an increase in per 
capita expenditure.  
To observe whether inter-household externality arising from the education of bari 
individuals are also capturing some income effects, we turn to columns (3) and (4), which 
respectively treat LnPCE as an exogenous and endogenous regressors. Reassuringly, in both 
specifications, most of our earlier evidence of social effects remain statistically significant 
and preserve their expected signs. Mean schooling of bari girls and boys are all significant 
and positive.  
 
19 As excluded instruments, we use total market value of assets and total number of cows owned by the 
household (see column 5). These instruments are highly significant in the first stage and comfortably pass the 
validity test. Despite the fact that our excluded instruments pass the validity test, we are cautious in being 
conclusive about these IV results. The use of cows as instrument, for example, could be contested. For farm 
households, however, this variable potentially reflects demand for child labour and hence a priori, could be 
disputed as a choice for valid exclusion restriction. 
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We further investigate the above results by re-estimating our model separately for 
the sample of “non-linked” and “linked” households (see Appendix Tables 4 and 5). For the 
“non-linked” sample, mean schooling of children and adults in the bari continue to exert a 
significant positive influence. Particularly reassuring is the significance of the effect of the 
older cohort of boys and girls. Turning to intra-household externalities, we also find a 
significant effect of uneducated mother on their children’s education when they co-reside 
with primary educated non-spouse adults in the household. However, evidence supporting 
within-household education spillover is absent in the sample of “linked” households. 
5.3 Additional Test of Inter-household Education Externality  
The evidence of neighbourhood effect, even if robust to host of controls for household and 
neighbourhood attributes and composition, could arguably be driven by common exposure 
of children in same neighbourhoods to public education programs. Two such programs are 
food-for-education (FFE) and female secondary stipend (FSS) which have been instrumental 
in increasing school participation in rural Bangladesh in recent years. However, both of 
these programs were introduced during the 1990s. Looking  at school attainment of adults 
therefore provides a way to circumvent this problem as they were not exposed to any of 
these interventions. Any evidence of peer effect for the adult sample therefore cannot be 
attributed to common participation in public education programs.  
To this end, we estimate a model of wage work participation (via IV-Probit 
regressions) for a sample of adults aged 20-32 years where schooling is treated as an 
endogenous regressors. Peer effect is investigated in the first stage regression where 
retrospective measures of bari schooling serve as instruments for an individual’s educational 
attainment. The regressions also control various individual characteristics such as age, age 
squared, religion and gender. Additionally, household landholding is included as a regressor. 
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We use four lagged variables as instruments for years of schooling: (i) mean peer schooling 
of boys in the own cohort, (ii) mean peer schooling of girls in the own cohort, (iii) mean 
peer schooling of older cohort and (iv) mean schooling of adults (i.e. individuals aged 18-65 
year olds) in the bari. These variables were calculated using MSEC 1982 data. 
 Using the bari characteristics as instrumental variables for the endogenous education 
variable in the wage participation regression is somewhat similar to the practice of using 
family background variables as IV for grade completion in an individual wage regression. 
There is ample application of such instruments in the economics literature on returns to 
education. As with family background variables, the exogeneity of bari variables as IVs is 
not always obvious since these instruments are not generated by any natural or quasi-natural 
experiments. Given these potential problems, we do not claim that the IV estimates reported 
in this section decisively solve the endogeneity problem of schooling variable in wage 
participation. It is simply meant to be illustrative of the hypothesis that bari schooling in 
early childhood generates spillover effects which are reflected in greater labour force 
participation in later years via increased schooling attainment. 
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Table 3: Probit and IV-Probit estimates of determinants of wage-work participation (Adults 
aged 20-32 years) 
Probit IV-Probit 
 
1st Stage 
Schooling 
Age 0.001 0.001 -0.124 
(1.73)+ (1.86)+ (11.83)** 
Hindu -0.030 -0.029 -0.188 
 (5.77)** (5.59)** (2.07)* 
Female -0.143 -0.143 -0.221 
 (22.84)** (22.77)** (3.14)** 
Married -0.022 -0.019 -0.425 
 (4.18)** (3.58)** (5.11)** 
Years of schooling 0.012 0.015  
 (21.52)** (8.61)**  
Household size -0.005 -0.005 0.189 
 (1.05) (1.07) (2.42)* 
Total homestead land of household -0.000 -0.000 0.030 
 (0.30) (1.08) (13.30)** 
Total cultivable land of household -0.000 -0.000 0.006 
 (3.63)** (3.98)** (20.05)** 
Mean peer schooling, boys of own cohort in 1982   0.092 
 (3.73)** 
Mean peer schooling, girls  of own cohort in 1982   0.134 
 (4.54)** 
Mean peer schooling, older cohort in 1982   0.140 
 (6.53)** 
Mean schooling of adults in Bari in 1982   0.466 
 (20.27)** 
Pseudo/Adjusted R2 0.23 0.17 0.24 
Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity (p-values)  .059  
N 9749 9749 9749 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. The shaded area indicates variables that have been treated as endogenous and subsequently, instrumented. 
All the regression estimates correspond to marginal effects (instead of regression coefficients). Regression 
intercept suppressed.  
 
The determinants of wage work participation from the probit and IV-probit models are 
reported in Table 3. All the estimates reported correspond to the marginal effects instead of 
regression coefficients. The bottom panel reports result of a test of exogeneity for the probit 
model with an endogenous regressor proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986)20. Rejection of 
the null indicates that schooling is endogenous and hence, the IV-probit is preferred over the 
 
20 The test involves specifying that the exogeneity of schooling variable is under suspicion. Under the null 
hypothesis, the probit model is appropriately specified with all explanatory variables as exogenous. Under the 
alternative hypothesis, the suspected endogenous schooling variable is expressed as linear projections of a set 
of instruments (including bari mean schooling variables), and the residuals from those first-stage regressions 
are added to the model. Under the null hypothesis, these residuals should have no explanatory power. 
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standard probit estimator. Both probit and IV-probit estimates yield positive and significant 
effects of the schooling variable. All the other regressors have usual signs. The highly 
significant effect of the four lagged schooling variables in the first stage is consistent with 
our earlier evidence of significant positive effect of bari schooling on children’s grade 
completion. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has provided a detailed account of social determinants of children’s school 
completion in rural Bangladesh. We have tested for the presence of inter-household 
externalities in children’s grade completion within rural residential neighbourhoods in 
Bangladesh. We find some evidence of inter-household externalities: mean schooling of 
boys and girls in the bari raise grade attainment of an individual child. These effects are 
significant and large irrespective of whether we focus on the mean schooling of peers of 
own or older cohorts in the bari.
There are three pieces of evidence that espouse social effect as an explanation for the 
neighbourhood effects reported in this study. First, the results remain unchanged even when 
we account for neighbourhood composition. Households in a bari are often potentially 
linked in terms of their recent history of partition. Recently partitioned households often 
maintain significant socio-economic ties so that their presence in the data is a potential 
source of “correlated” (non-social) effects which masks genuine social effect. Yet, 
regression results yield significant coefficient on mean schooling of own and older cohorts 
of peers in the bari even when we purge our sample of the “linked” households. This finding 
remains unchanged to further control for household expenditure. Second, the finding of 
positive peer effect is robust to control for host of household and neighbourhood 
characteristics. In particular, we allow for endogeneity of household expenditure by re-
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estimating schooling regressions in an instrumental variable framework. However, this does 
not drive out our result of inter-household externality. 
 Finally, we demonstrate that the evidence on peer effect is not driven by educational-
reform related “correlated effects” e.g. all children from some neighbourhoods benefit from 
public interventions, such as the FFE program. To this end, we test for peer effects for an 
older cohort of individuals who completed schooling at a time when these educational 
interventions were non-existent. Using a sample of adults for whom retrospective records on 
their childhood residential neighbourhoods is available, we test whether mean education of 
peers during their school years affects labour market participation decisions via increasing 
school attaining of an index adult. First, we estimate a simple model of wage work 
participation, where an individual’s educational attainment is endogenous. Subsequently, we 
test the hypothesis that the mean schooling of peers in the bari during an individual’s 
childhood are valid and strong instruments for own schooling. Our analysis confirms this 
hypothesis. The significance of peer variables in the first-stage regression of schooling, thus 
once again suggest the presence of a social effect (externality) originating from the 
schooling of peers in the neighbourhood. This lends further support to the evidence of peer 
effects in children’s schooling for the sample of children currently of school age in our data.  
In addition to the evidence of inter-household education externalities, we find 
considerable evidence of intra-household externality enjoyed by children of uneducated 
mothers due to their proximity to primary educated adults in the household. This evidence is 
sufficiently robust to fully control for neighbourhood fixed effects; within-household 
externality is larger when the male spouse is also uneducated. Our finding of within-
household externality is particularly important in rural Bangladesh, where the overall 
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literacy rate (among those aged 7 years and above) is as low as 44.3 per cent (in 1995) and 
28.5 percent for females.  
The suggestive evidence presented in this paper has important policy implications 
for education policy design in developing countries. The evidence of intra-household 
externality – children of uneducated parents are better off when co-residing with educated 
non-parent adults in the same househol.-- implies that traditional public interventions (such 
as cash subsidies, stipends, fee waivers and so on) to attract and retain the “difficult-to-
reach” at risk children from poor households to schools may be complemented by more 
longer-term policy of improving the schooling levels of the adult population. This can be 
accomplished via educational investment in low skilled parents, particularly uneducated 
mothers. Any externality arising from such investments are, nevertheless, likely to be 
captured by own children only, which may not benefit neighbouring children of school age, 
as evidenced from the insignificant effect of educated adult (female) neighbours in the bari 
on children’s schooling. The same is, however, not true if a child within the neighbourhood 
is targeted for an educational intervention. Policies designed at increasing schooling of one 
child (in educationally deprived neighbourhoods) has important spillover effects on 
schooling outcomes of other children in the bari with a feedback to further boost schooling 
of the targeted student. Our evidence of significant positive effect of mean schooling of 
neighbourhood children on individual grade completion supports this hypothesis.  
To conclude, traditional public interventions (such as conditional cash transfers, fee 
waivers and so on) to attract and retain a child in school is also likely to benefit other 
neighbouring children of school age. In other words, policies designed at increasing 
schooling of one child in educationally deprived neighbourhoods has important spillover 
effects on schooling outcomes of other children in the bari with a feedback to further boost 
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schooling of the targeted student. Our evidence of significant positive effect of mean 
schooling of bari children on individual grade completion supports this hypothesis. That 
said, clearer evidence of the social effect is necessary to ascertain whether the observed 
effect, indeed reflects endogenous social effects, as opposed to contextual effects. This is a 
challenge that future research on social interactions in educational production should 
address for developing countries.  
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Appendix Table 1: Means statistics of sample observations and variable definition  
(Children aged 6-17 years) 
Variable Definition  Mean SD
Grade Years of grade completed in school 2.34 2.41
Age   Measured in years 11.27 3.42
Female =1 if female 0.49 0.50
Hindu =1 if Hindu 0.12 0.32
Birth order in family Birth order of index child within family [eldest child has smallest value] 1.88 1.01
Household variables  
Age of household-head In years 46.43 11.30
Household-head is female = 1 if household-head is female 0.15 0.36
Education of household-head Years of education completed by household-head 2.95 3.53
Head has no education =1 if head has no education 0.49 0.50
Head completed grade 1-4 =1 if head has grade 1-4 education 0.18 0.39
Head has no education but proximate =1 if head uneducated and a primary educated adult present in family 0.13 0.34
Head has 1-4 grade & proximate 
=1 if head  educated 1-4 grade co-resides with a primary educated adult in 
the family 0.08 0.26
Household-head is agriculturist =1 if head is in agriculture 0.30 0.46
Household-head is day labourer =1 if head is a day labourer 0.11 0.31
Age of head’s spouse Head's spouse's age 31.96 16.99
Data on age of head’s spouse missing =1 if head's spouse age data missing 0.18 0.38
Head’s spouse has no education =1 if head's spouse has no education 0.53 0.50
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4 education =1 if head's spouse has grades 1-4 education 0.12 0.33
Head’s spouse has no education & 
proximate 
=1 if uneducated spouse co-resides with a primary educated adult in the 
household 0.21 0.41
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4  education & 
proximate 
=1 if 1-4 grade educated spouse co-resides with a primary educated adult 
in family 0.07 0.26
Total homestead land of household  Household-owned homestead land (in decimals) 10.77 14.55
Total cultivable land of household Household-owned cultivable land (in decimals) 63.37 108.97
Bari variables  
Mean peer schooling, girls of own cohort Own cohort includes any child aged at most 2 years older/younger  1.97 2.13
Mean peer schooling, boys of own cohort Own cohort includes any child aged at most 2 years older/younger 2.01 2.10
Mean peer schooling, girls of older cohort Older cohort includes any peer older than the index child by 3-5 years 2.67 2.77
Missing, female =1 if data is missing for “mean peer schooling, girls of older cohort” 0.29 0.45
Mean peer schooling, boys of older cohort Older cohort includes any peer older than the index child by 3-5 years  2.86 2.86
Missing, male =1 if data is missing for “mean peer schooling, boys of older cohort” 0.26 0.44
Maximum schooling among peers  Maximum grade completed among bari children (aged 6-17) 6.24 2.31
Birth order in bari Birth order of the index child among peers in bari 8.51 9.70
Mean schooling of adults in bari mean schooling of bari adults 3.14 2.06
Mean schooling of male adults in bari mean schooling of bari adult males 3.93 2.54
Grade 1-4 educated mother in bari =1 if at least one 1-4 grade educated mother present in bari 0.52 0.50
Primary educated mother in bari =1 if at least one 5+ grade completed mother present in bari 0.55 0.50
Primary educated adult female in bari =1 if at least one 1-4 grade educated bari non-mother female(1) present 0.19 0.40
Grade 1-4 educated female adult in bari =1 if at least one 5+ grade completed bari non-mother female present 0.14 0.34
Number of children, 0-5 Total no. of 0-5 years olds in bari 7.62 8.88
Number of children, 6-17 Total no. of 6-17 years olds in bari 16.41 15.49
Number of children, 18+ Total no. of 18 years or older individuals in bari 27.03 25.24
Mean homestead land of bari Average homestead land owned by other HHs in bari (in decimals) 10.36 10.00
Mean cultivable land of bari Average cultivable land owned by other HHs in bari (in decimals) 59.74 69.40
N 22370
Note: (1) Sample excludes heads aged below 22 years to separate non-students. (2) Non-mother females are 
female adults (aged 18+) in bari with no own children present in their respective household. 
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Appendix Table 2: Neighbourhood fixed-effects estimates of determinants of grade 
completion of children (MHHs only) 
 
All MHHs 
 
MHHs with 
Uneducated heads 
Age 0.316 0.332 
(12.95)** (9.48)** 
(Age squared)/100 0.541 -0.039 
 (5.12)** (0.26) 
Female 0.006 -0.009 
 (0.26) (0.28) 
Birth order in family -0.177 -0.184 
 (12.26)** (8.23)** 
Age of household-head -0.002 -0.005 
 (1.19) (1.54) 
Education of household-head 0.055  
 (10.92)**  
Household-head is agriculturist -0.062 -0.004 
 (1.93)+ (0.07) 
Household-head is day labourer -0.362 -0.187 
 (8.35)** (3.11)** 
Age of head’s spouse 0.004 0.002 
 (1.51) (0.38) 
Head’s spouse has no education -0.771 -0.802 
 (15.77)** (7.63)** 
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4 education -0.348 -0.386 
 (5.04)** (2.95)** 
Head’s spouse has no education & proximate 0.342 0.506 
 (9.19)** (8.89)** 
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4 education & proximate 0.009 0.187 
 (0.12) (1.12) 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.35 
Bari Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
N 18906 8856 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. Regression constant has been suppressed. All the specifications include bari fixed effects and dummy for 
missing data of mothers/male head’s spouse. 
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Appendix Table 3: OLS, FE and IV estimates of determinants of grade completion of 
children using linked MHSS-Census sample (MHHs only) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FE IV-FE OLS IV 
 1st stage 
(LnPCE) 
Female 0.104 0.109 0.097 0.106 -0.018 
(2.21)* (2.29)* (2.27)* (2.39)* (1.38) 
Birth order in family -0.223 -0.250 -0.187 -0.200 -0.005 
 (6.01)** (6.46)** (7.16)** (7.36)** (0.58) 
Education of household-head 0.066 0.058 0.073 0.065 0.014 
 (4.26)** (3.61)** (8.16)** (6.80)** (5.10)** 
Head’s spouse has no education -0.500 -0.235 -0.547 -0.089 -0.332 
 (3.30)** (1.32) (6.22)** (0.87) (12.69)** 
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4 education -0.322 -0.088 -0.208 0.125 -0.211 
 (1.42) (0.36) (1.67)+ (0.95) (5.61)** 
Head’s spouse has no education & proximate 0.275 0.163 0.274 0.092 0.142 
 (2.38)* (1.32) (4.14)** (1.23) (7.13)** 
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4 education & proximate 0.150 -0.007 0.051 -0.106 0.118 
 (0.63) (0.03) (0.39) (0.77) (2.99)** 
LnPCE 0.430 1.170 0.606 1.431  
 (5.36)** (4.40)** (13.20)** (8.61)**  
Value of household asset     0.113 
 (16.93)** 
Total cows owned by household     0.040 
 (8.10)** 
Birth order in bari  0.040 0.041 0.045 0.045 0.000 
 (5.97)** (6.00)** (7.23)** (6.92)** (0.14) 
Mean peer schooling, girls of own cohort   0.104 0.103 -0.001 
 (7.99)** (7.63)** (0.31) 
Mean peer schooling, boys of own cohort   0.064 0.060 0.006 
 (4.80)** (4.33)** (1.61) 
Mean peer schooling, girls of older cohort   0.077 0.068 0.008 
 (5.87)** (5.01)** (1.96)+ 
Mean peer schooling, boys of older cohort   0.070 0.067 0.005 
 (5.76)** (5.31)** (1.36) 
Maximum schooling among peers    -0.031 -0.036 0.006 
 (1.86)+ (2.09)* (1.20) 
Mean schooling of male adults in bari   0.022 0.018 0.005 
 (2.04)* (1.61) (1.53) 
Grade 1-4) educated mother in bari   0.041 0.058 0.005 
 (0.79) (1.08) (0.29) 
Primary educated mother in bari   0.018 0.037 -0.010 
 (0.33) (0.65) (0.64) 
Primary educated adult female in bari   0.114 0.150 -0.048 
 (1.73)+ (2.21)* (2.45)* 
Grade 1-4 educated female adult in bari   0.031 0.041 -0.046 
 (0.40) (0.53) (1.99)* 
Adjusted R2 0.60 - 0.62 - 0.32 
Bari Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No No 
Village Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exogeneity test of LnPCE - 0.003 - 0.00 - 
Over-identification test  - 0.88 - 0.50 - 
N 4993 4993 4993 4993 4993 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. Regression constant has been suppressed. The regressions also control for total number of children aged 0-
5 years and 6-17 years, total number of adults in the bari, religion and head’s occupation, age and spousal age. 
Also included are dummies to control for missing data on mean peer schooling variables, head’s spouse age 
and number of cows. 
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Appendix Table 4: OLS, FE and IV estimates of determinants of grade completion of 
children using linked MHSS-MSEC sample “non-linked” households (MHHs only) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FE IV-FE OLS IV 
 1st stage 
(LnPCE) 
Age 0.395 0.382 0.273 0.251 0.016 
(6.30)** (6.03)** (4.46)** (4.01)** (0.91) 
(Age squared)/100 0.459 0.483 0.600 0.636 -0.008 
 (1.78)+ (1.86)+ (2.33)* (2.42)* (0.10) 
Female 0.097 0.104 0.093 0.101 -0.014 
 (1.69)+ (1.80)+ (1.74)+ (1.84)+ (0.87) 
Birth order in family -0.149 -0.170 -0.161 -0.175 -0.004 
 (3.19)** (3.54)** (4.78)** (5.05)** (0.45) 
Education of household-head 0.064 0.060 0.060 0.053 0.016 
 (3.22)** (2.98)** (5.31)** (4.39)** (4.79)** 
Head’s spouse has no education -0.807 -0.633 -0.731 -0.273 -0.362 
 (4.02)** (2.90)** (6.43)** (2.15)* (11.07)** 
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4 education -0.312 -0.164 -0.275 0.048 -0.230 
 (1.06) (0.54) (1.64) (0.28) (4.69)** 
Head’s spouse has no education & proximate 0.405 0.328 0.315 0.173 0.112 
 (2.93)** (2.28)* (3.87)** (1.97)* (4.72)** 
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4 education & proximate -0.093 -0.222 0.097 -0.015 0.100 
 (0.31) (0.72) (0.56) (0.08) (1.97)* 
LnPCE 0.400 0.850 0.599 1.277  
 (3.90)** (3.54)** (10.30)** (6.49)**  
Value of household asset     0.117 
 (13.90)** 
Total cows owned by household     0.049 
 (7.52)** 
Birth order in bari  0.056 0.057 0.054 0.052 0.002 
 (6.39)** (6.42)** (6.21)** (5.88)** (0.83) 
Mean peer schooling, girls of own cohort   0.095 0.097 -0.005 
 (6.12)** (6.11)** (1.02) 
Mean peer schooling, boys of own cohort   0.040 0.040 0.002 
 (2.56)* (2.50)* (0.43) 
Mean peer schooling, girls of older cohort   0.091 0.086 0.002 
 (5.60)** (5.21)** (0.40) 
Mean peer schooling, boys of older cohort   0.060 0.058 0.002 
 (3.96)** (3.78)** (0.49) 
Maximum schooling among peers    -0.049 -0.058 0.014 
 (2.36)* (2.72)** (2.39)* 
Mean schooling of male adults in bari   0.036 0.029 0.009 
 (2.71)** (2.13)* (2.42)* 
Grade 1-4) educated mother in bari   0.052 0.068 0.010 
 (0.79) (1.01) (0.52) 
Primary educated mother in bari   -0.004 -0.009 0.019 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.94) 
Primary educated adult female in bari   0.038 0.078 -0.034 
 (0.46) (0.92) (1.42) 
Grade 1-4 educated female adult in bari   0.034 0.043 -0.050 
 (0.34) (0.42) (1.71)+ 
Adjusted R2 0.61 - 0.62 - 0.35 
Bari Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No No 
Village Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exogeneity test of LnPCE - 0.08 - 0.00 -
Over-identification test - 0.25 - 0.11 -
N 3337 3337 3337 3337 3337 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. Regression constant has been suppressed. Columns (1) and (2) also controlled for religion, two dummies 
for head’s occupation (whether a day labourer or an agriculturist) and spouse’s age. The regressions in 
columns (3)-(5) also control for total number of children aged 0-5 years and 6-17 years, total number of adults 
in the bari, religion and head’s occupation and spouse’s age. Also included are dummies to control for missing 
data on mean peer schooling variables, head’s spousal age and number of cows. 
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Appendix Table 5: OLS, FE and IV estimates of determinants of grade completion of 
children using linked MHSS-MSEC sample “linked” households (MHHs only) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FE IV-FE OLS IV 
 1st stage 
(LnPCE) 
Age 0.136 0.187 0.210 0.205 0.001 
(1.32) (1.65)+ (2.26)* (2.14)* (0.05) 
(Age squared)/100 0.938 0.746 0.795 0.797 -0.007 
 (2.20)* (1.59) (1.99)* (1.95)+ (0.06) 
Female 0.032 0.025 0.026 0.037 -0.029 
 (0.34) (0.25) (0.32) (0.43) (1.23) 
Birth order in family -0.397 -0.397 -0.159 -0.168 -0.009 
 (5.09)** (4.81)** (2.99)** (3.08)** (0.60) 
Age of household-head -0.014 -0.008 0.002 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.81) (0.45) (0.24) (1.30) (1.49) 
Education of household-head 0.063 0.048 0.079 0.087 0.001 
 (1.66)+ (1.15) (4.23)** (4.61)** (0.20) 
Head’s spouse has no education 0.259 0.702 -0.479 -0.080 -0.300 
 (0.79) (1.55) (2.83)** (0.37) (6.11)** 
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4 education -0.713 -0.099 -0.360 -0.082 -0.162 
 (1.51) (0.15) (1.65)+ (0.35) (2.53)* 
Head’s spouse has no education & proximate -0.262 -0.080 0.180 -0.076 0.262 
 (0.90) (0.24) (1.20) (0.38) (6.06)** 
Head’s spouse has grade 1-4 education & 
proximate 0.493 0.470 0.009 -0.229 0.197 
 (0.90) (0.81) (0.03) (0.80) (2.62)** 
LnPCE 0.245 2.091 0.549 1.285  
 (1.29) (1.69)+ (5.68)** (3.03)**  
Value of household asset     0.099 
 (7.48)** 
Total cows owned by household     0.021 
 (2.53)* 
Birth order in bari -0.029 -0.019 0.036 0.041 -0.008 
 (0.82) (0.51) (1.21) (1.34) (0.93) 
Mean peer schooling, girls of own cohort   0.108 0.114 -0.008 
 (3.74)** (3.82)** (0.94) 
Mean peer schooling, boys of own cohort   0.142 0.133 0.010 
 (5.13)** (4.65)** (1.29) 
Mean peer schooling, girls of older cohort   0.039 0.026 0.012 
 (1.21) (0.77) (1.31) 
Mean peer schooling, boys of older cohort   0.022 0.035 -0.011 
 (0.74) (1.12) (1.27) 
Maximum schooling among peers    -0.041 -0.048 0.011 
 (1.27) (1.45) (1.14) 
Mean schooling of male adults in bari   0.027 0.023 0.005 
 (1.45) (1.20) (0.90) 
Grade 1-4 educated mother in bari   -0.026 -0.093 0.122 
 (0.23) (0.77) (3.79)** 
Primary educated mother in bari   0.180 0.197 -0.009 
 (1.59) (1.71)+ (0.27) 
Primary educated adult female in bari   0.366 0.433 -0.119 
 (1.88)+ (2.13)* (2.09)* 
Grade 1-4 educated female adult in bari   0.235 0.199 -0.019 
 (0.94) (0.77) (0.25) 
Adjusted R2 0.57 - 0.62 - 0.27 
Bari Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No No 
Village Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Exogeneity test of LnPCE - .11 - .068 - 
Over-identification test - .85 - .015 - 
N 1347 1347 1347 1347 1347 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. Regression constant has been suppressed. Columns (1) and (2) also controlled for religion, head’s 
occupation and spouse’s age. The regressions in columns (3)-(5) also control for total number of children aged 
0-5 years and 6-17 years, total number of adults in the bari, religion and head’s occupation and spouse’s age. 
Also included are dummies to control for missing data on mean schooling of peers, head’s spousal age and 
number of cows. 
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